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1Do European carriers dominate their hubs?
Mark G. Lijesen* Piet Rietveld**Peter Nijkamp**
Abstract We analyze the phenomenon of hub dominance by developing a model relating
fares to distance, using the main leg of intercontinental flights for scaling purposes. Our
results indicate that at least some of the major European carriers place a mark up on flights
originating from or going to their hubs.
Key words: Civil aviation, Hub and spoke system, Market power
JEL codes: L110, L930, R41
1. Introduction
One surprising effect of the deregulation of civil aviation in the United States was the
rapid development of hub and spoke systems by nearly all U.S. carriers. Giving way
to economically healthy airline operations, the use, and especially the domination of
hubs, may hinder competition. In his lengthy paper, Levi e (1987) introduced
deviations from pure competition in airline markets, among which hub domination.
Borenstein (1989) was the first to give empirical proof of this phenomenon, renaming
it to airport dominance. In the early nineties, several papers and articles have been
published on the price effects of hub domination by U.S. carriers.
Marín (1995) on the other hand finds that European firms on liberalized routes exploit
their hub related cost advantages to compete in prices. He explains the differences
with the U.S. situation by stating ‘…during the period studied the CRSs [computer
reservation systems] in the US belong to single companies while in Europe they are
shared by several firms, frequent flier programmes were almost non-existent in
Europe and direct flight networks prevail in Europe in contrast to a hub-and-spoke
systems in the US.’1 However, much has changed in European aviation since 1989, the
year to which Marín’s data apply: both hub-and-spoke networks and frequent flier
programs have become common features nowadays. The question arises whether
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2European carriers, now that these changes have spread over Europe, also started
acquiring hub domination rents.  In this paper we will address the question whether
Europe’s main carriers charge higher prices from flights originating from their hubs.
In the two following sections, we discuss the concept and causes of airport dominance
and earlier empirical work on the subject. Section 4 describes the framework for
further analysis. The data are described in section 5, followed by our results in section
6. In the final section, we formulate some concluding remarks.
2. A carrier dominating its hub
The concept of airport dominance points at a carrier dominating its hub airport. From
this point of view, Levine’s term ‘hub domination’, may be slightly more accurate
than Borenstein’s ‘airport dominance’. One could also argue that the carrier
dominates the airport region, not the airport itself, although the latter may also be the
case to some extent. Berry (1990) expresses a slightly different point of view, by
interpreting the dominant position of a carrier on its hub as a form of product
differentiation. All views have in common however that the dominant carrier charges
a higher price to passengers originating from its hub, without being punished for it by
lower demand. The reasons for this kind of market power lie partly in the nature of
hub and spoke operations, partly in marketing devices and partly in other factors.2
Frequent flyer programs (FFPs) are a well known marketing device in civil aviation
worldwide. With these programs, customers can acquire credit points from a specific
carrier in relation to distance traveled. These points can then be used for gifts, free
travel or for upgrades (i.e. to have an economy class ticket upgraded to a business
class ticket). FFPs make clever use of the principal-agent problem. A frequent
business traveler does not have to pay his ticket himself, but he will benefit from the
FFP. In this way, the relative reward of  FFPs is greate  than it would have been for a
passenger paying for his own ticket.
                                                                      
1 Marín (1995), p. 155.
3An important reason for the success of FFPs is sometimes their non-linearity: the
awards may then grow as points accumulate. This feature causes increasing marginal
returns, thus rewarding loyalty, especially so for the home carrier. After all, the home
carrier is the carrier that flies most routes from the travelers home town, thereby
offering the largest opportunities to both collect and use points.
Travel agent commission overrides (TACOs) a e the equivalent of FFPs for travel
agents. Like FFPs,TACO’s rely on the principal-agent problem, letting passengers
pay for the travel agent’s reward. By making the travel agent’s commission dependent
of the revenue he generates for the airline, and by doing this in a nonlinear way, the
carrier offers a strong incentive for loyalty to the agent. Like with FFPs, the airline
offering the largest number of destinations, is likely to have the most effective
override program. Any rational travel agent would therefore stick to the TACO
program of the home carrier in his own region. To avoid the abuse of travel agents’
commissions as loyalty programs, the European Commission issued guidelines that
limit the nonlinear character of the instrument.3
As we mentioned before, FFP en TACO programs are most effective for the carrier
serving the largest number of destinations, and this is likely to be the home carrier.
Apart form serving the largest number of destinations, the home carrier is also likely
to serve most destinations from its hub at a higher frequency than its competitors,
although this may not  be the case if the destination is a competitor’s hub. Other
things being equal, higher frequency makes an airline more attractive to customers,
since it enlarges their chances of departing at their desired time. This may also be a
reason why travelers, especially those with high time values, are willing to pay a
higher price for a flight with the home carrier.
Another possible source of market power of a carrier on its hub airport is that it may
have some bureaucratic control over the airport. Not only is the home carrier the
hub’s best client, it is often the airport’s main source of financing. Especially at
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4congested or near-congested airports, this may give rise to control over airport
operations, giving the main carrier an instrument to deter entry or hinder competitors.
The causes for airport dominance mentioned above, have been acknowledged before
by other authors, such as Berry (1990) and Borenstein (1989). However, since their
studies focus on U.S. situations, they have not mentioned another cause that may also
be a source of rents for airlines. When there is a national airline, or flag carrier,
travelers are likely to be biased in favor of their own flag carrier. Since almost any
European country, as a matter of fact probably almost any country outside the USA,
has a flag carrier (or a former flag carrier), national pride is likely to be one more
source of dominance of a carrier at its hub. Of course, the presence of domestic
competitors may reduce the importance of a flag carrier.
3. Earlier empirical work
The first to tackle the problem of airport dominance empirically, was Seve in
Borenstein in his 1989 paper. Borenstein relates the fare paid for a trip to cost-
inducing and demand related characteristics of the trip. Next he uses relative prices
for scaling. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the price of a carrier on a route
relative to the price of an other carrier on that same route. By scaling to a competitor
on the same route, Bo enstein is able to reduce the model to carrier specific
differences only.
The variable reflecting hub dominance in Borenstein’s paper is the average of a
carrier’s share of daily passengers originating at the two endpoints of  the route,
weighted by the proportion of passengers on the route who originate at each endpoint.
Borenstein finds the effect of this variable on fare differences to be significantly
positive, indicating dominant positions of carriers on their hubs.
In his 1991 paper, Borenstein again uses differences on the same routes as a scaling
method. This time however, the share of traffic on a route is the dependent variable.
Again, Borenstein finds significant positive results, indicating that carriers exercise
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5some market power over their hubs. Bo enstein (1991) also tries to isolate the effect
of Computer Reservation Systems. He finds that the effect is small and statistically
insignificant.
Berry (1990) estimates a structural model, using airport presence as an explanatory
variable in both cost and demand equations. Airport presence is defined as the number
of top 50 cities served by an airline out of a given city. Berry finds that airport
presence has a positive effect on demand and at the same time lowers costs. Though
Berry interprets airport presence as product differentiation and therefore different then
Borenstein’s market power approach of hub dominance, their results point in the same
direction.
Evans and Kessides (1993) use a fixed effects estimation method to test whether
airport and route dominance, both measured by respective market shares, have a
significant effect on fares. They find that airport dominance confers substantial
pricing power upon the carrier, which is consistent with earlier results by Borenstein
(1989, 1991) and Berry (1990). However, they also find that the isolated impact of
route dominance on fares, is insignificant, contrary to Borenstein’s findi gs. Evans
and Kessides explain this difference by stating that, contrary to airports, routes are
contestable, since planes can easily be switched between routes, whereas airport
facilities and FFPs can not.
Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996) extend Berry’s earlier work on the influence of
airport presence on costs and demand. Using an unobserved product characteristic to
capture restrictions placed on a ticket, and thus implicitly dividing the market between
‘tourists’ and ‘business’ travelers, they find that airport presence has a positive effect
on demand and a negative effect on costs. The cost-reducing effect of airport presence
can be interpreted as the returns stemming from the economic rationale of the hub and
spoke system. The effects are labeled ‘hub premium’, leaving aside whether it stems
from product differentiation, market power or both.
Goetz and Sutton (1997, p. 258) also find some indications of market power on
concentrated hub markets. They find that ‘…passengers flying from small-city
6airports to major airports paid 34 percent more if the major airport was concentrated
and 42 percent more if both the small-city and the major airport were concentrated.’
Marín (1995) has been the first to address the issue in a European context, by
estimating both a market share and a price equation, in a regulated and a deregulated
segment.4 Marín finds that the effect of airport presence is not significant in a
regulated environment and significantly negative in a deregulated environment. This
implies that, contrary to the U.S. situation, European carriers in a deregulated
environment tend to exploit the cost reducing effect of airport presence in order to
compete in prices. Ma ín (1995) explains the difference between his European results
and earlier U.S. estimates by signaling significant differences in the causes of market
power. In Europe at that time, CRSs were owned by multiple European carriers, FFPs
hardly existed in Europe and the hub and spoke system had not yet gained as much
ground yet as it had in the U.S. aviation industry. Because of these differences,
several causes of hub dominance had less impact than in the U.S., which may explain
the absence of hub dominance in Marín’s results.
4. Analytical Framework
Our analysis rests on the assumption that fares are cost related. Furthermore, we
assume that costs are distance related. When we combine these assumptions, we find
that there should be a relationship between fares and distance. Earlier empirical work
analyzing this relationship includes Hansen (1990) and  Windl  and Dresner (1999).
Hansen (1990) uses a model relating fare to market characteristics. He finds that
variables other than distance related variables, like market size and concentration,
have no statistically significant effects. Distance indicators were significant, but the
R2 of 0.73 implies that there are also other factors than distance that determine fares.
Windle and Dresner (1999) estimate a model explaining fares on five categories of
routes from variables such  as distance, distance squared and population, using
dummies for slot controlled routes, vacation routes and eleven quarter dummies. In
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7four out of five route categories, the influence of distance is statistically significant, in
three out of five also distance squared was significant. In two categories population
(the product of the populations of the origin and destinations cities) had a significant
negative influence. The vacation route dummy had a significant negative impact along
the line, and the influence of the slot control dummy was significant and positive in
two out of four categories.5
The message above is clear: there is a statistically significant relationship between
fare and distance. The impact of other variables is not always clear however. Now let
us turn from the relationship between fare and distance to the analytical framework of
this paper.
Figure 1: A simple hub and spoke network
A
B
C
Y
H
X
Z
Consider a simple hub and spoke network, as shown in figure 1. In this network, we
define H as the hub, A to C as close spokes and X to Z as distant spokes. Assuming
distance-related fares, we define the natural logarithm of the fare of a flight from hub
H to destination Z as:
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8log logfare dist C hdpHZ HZ HZ HZ= + + +a b c (1)
Where distHZ is the distance from airport H to airport Z, C is a vector of unobservable
company specific factors and aHZ bHZ andc are parameters. The variable hdp
represents the hub dominance premium, an extra markup that the home carrier is
confident enough to place on hub originating fares. We should keep in mind however,
that this is a relative me sure. Consider a situation where we, as we will do later in
the paper, analyze fares of five different companies. If we use the maximum number
of four company specific hdp’s in our specification, the choice of the numeraire
would determine the sign of the dp’s. This problem is however easily solved, since
there exists no such thing as negative airport dominance. So the company with the
lowest hdp should be the numeraire. The numeraire company is then the one with the
weakest airport dominance, which doesn’t necessarily mean it has no dominance at
all. In order to account for airport specific cost factors, we add dummies for the origin
and destination:6
log logfare dist C H Z hdpHZ HZ HZ HZ H Z= + + + + +a b c j j (2)
Similar to equation (2), we define the fare of a flight from origin A via hub H to
destination Z as:
log logfare dist C A H ZAHZ AHZ AHZ AHZ A H Z= + + + + +a b c j j j2 (3)
Note that we entered the dummy for the hub airport twice, since a return flight lands
and takes of at the hub twice. Next, we use the distinction between close and distant
spokes for scaling purposes, by defining relative fare, Rfare as:
Rfare
fare
fare
AHZ
HZ
= (4)
                                                                      
a barrier to entry through scarce slots, leaves room for higher fares.
6 An alternative for the airport dummies would be to enter the country’s income per capita, to model
some form of price discrimination. This did not yield statistically significant results.
9When we substitute equations (3) and (2) into equation (4), we get:
log log
log
Rfare dist C A H Z
dist C H Z hdp
AHZ AHZ AHZ A H Z
HZ HZ HZ H Z
= + + + + +
- - - - - -
a b c j j j
a b c j j
2
(5)
Which simplifies to:
log log logRfare dist A H dist hdpAHZ AHZ A H HZ HZ= + + + - -a b j j b (6)
where:
a a a= -AHZ HZ (7)
Next, we distinguish between two specifications. First, in specification A, we assume
that:
b b b= =AHZ HZ (8)
so we rewrite:
log logRfare Rdist A H hdpA H= + + + -a b j j (A)
with:
Rdist
dist
dist
AHZ
HZ
= (9)
In our second specification (B), we rewrite equation (6) in order to avoid having to
make the assumption expressed in equation (8):
log log ( )logRfare Rdist A H dist hdpAHZ A H AHZ HZ HZ= + + + + - -a b j j b b (B)
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Parameter b represents the fare elasticity of a small increase in distance, which should
be comparable to the cost elasticity of a small increase in distance. In aviation, costs
are positively related to distance, but less than proportionally, so we expect b to be
between 0 and 1. If we find that bAHZ-bHZ does not differ significantly from zero, the
hypothesis stated in equation (8) can not be rejected, and (B) simplifies to (A). If both
parameters differ significantly, we would expect the sign of bAHZ-bHZ to be nega ive,
because of the less than proportional relation of costs to distance mentioned above.
Up to this point, we have assumed that the only deviation from cost related fares
comes from airport dominance. Differences in fare may however also come from
differences in competition on specific routes. We use the Herf ndahl-Hir chman index
(HHI) to account for differences in route competition. For consistency in scaling, we
would like to use the HHIs of routes A-H-Z and H-Z. Any route A-H-Z is almost
certainly a monopoly route however, since shared hubs are non existent in Europe.
Therefore, we consider route A-Z as the relevant route, with A-H-Z as a close
substitute. For consistency, we will calculate the HHI for route A-Z, HHIA-Z, using all
direct and one-stop flights between A and Z. In the same manner, we define HHIH-Z,
as the HHI for route H-Z and all its one-stop alternatives. We rewrite:
log logRfare Rdist A H hdp HHI HHIA H HZ HZ AZ AZ= + + + - + +a b j j f f (A’)
Now the question arises what the effect of route competition on Rfar will be. R call
figure 1, where a carrier flies from A to Z via H. Suppose competition increases on
the main leg, H-Z. Two effects can be distinguished. The first effect, which we will
call the direct effect is that the carriers operating route H-Z will lower their prices.
Our second effect, the indirect effect, comes from competition between close
substitutes. The competition increase on H-Z also means an increase in competition
for any carrier operating a direct route from A-Z, since the number of close substitutes
rises. So the price of a direct route from A to Z will decrease, forcing other carriers to
lower their prices for indirect flights from A to Z, such as A-H-Z.
The effect of the HHI of route H-Z on Rfare in equation (A’) is therefore ambiguous.
If the direct effect is larger than the indirect effect, the sign will be negative and vice
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versa. The same line of reason holds for the sign of the effect of HHIAZ, be it w th
opposite outcomes.
Although the HHI is widely used and accepted as an indicator for competition, it does
have some limitations. One of those limitations, brought forward by Hannan (1997),
is that the HHI implicitly gives equal weight to the roles of market share inequalities
and the number of competitors. Hannan solves this problem by decomposing the HHI
into the variation of outputs and the inverse of the number of competitors:
HHI
V
N N
= +
2 1
One way of testing whether the implicit equal weight assumption is right, is to
estimate parameters for both indicators and check whether their signs differ
significantly. A slightly different approach is to use the inverse number of competitor
as an additional explanatory variable and test whether it differs significantly from
zero.7 So we adjust (B) in the following way:
log log ( )log
( ) ( )
Rfare Rdist A H hdp dist
HHI
N
HHI
N
AHZ A H AHZ HZ HZ
HZ HZ
HZ
HZ
AZ AZ
AZ
AZ
= + + + - + -
+ + + +
a b j j b b
f
l
f
l (C)
5. Description of the data set
We selected ten European origins and five non-European destinations. Eight out of
these ten origins are also intercontinental hubs for their flag carrier. In selecting the
origins and destinations, we tried to combine geographical spread with low numbers
of missing values.8 The airports used in the analysis are summarized in table 1.
Combining the airports, and for obvious reasons omitting routes originating from its
own  hub (for instance AMS-AMS-JFK), we arrive at 9´8´ 5=360 obse vations.
                                   
7 See Hannan (1997) for a further explanation.
8 The latter is especially important with destinations. If one carrier doesn’t serve one destination, nine
observations are lost.
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 Table 1: Origins, hubs and destinations in the sample
From (abbreviation)Via (carrier) To (abbreviation)
Amsterdam (AMS) Amsterdam (KLM) New York JFK (JFK)
Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG)Paris Charles de Gaulle (Air France)Los ngeles (LAX)
London Heathrow (LHR)London Heathrow (British Airways)Tokyo (NRT)
Frankfurt (FRA) Frankfurt (Lufthansa)Cairo (CAI)
Milan Malpensa (MXP) Milan Malpensa (Alitalia) Singapore (SIN)
Brussels (BRU) Brussels (Sabena)
Venice (VCE) -
Athens (ATH) Athens (Olympic)
Zurich (ZRH) Zurich (Swissair)
Prague (PRG) -
The fare and frequency data are retrieved from the internet page of Tra locity, using
a strict set of rules for comparability of fares (see appendix A for more details). Due
to missing links in the networks of the carriers, 138 observations were missing from
the data. For all BA flights to Tokyo, fare data were unavailable, leaving a d taset of
213 observations. Table 2 summarizes the number of observations by destination and
carrier. The information in the table is somewhat biased because there are no fare data
available for British Airways’ flights to Tokyo. However, we can still recognize some
characteristics of the European airline market. First of all, we see the important
function of Singapore as a hub to South East Asia and Australia for European carriers.
Also the U.S. destinations are served from a large number of origins, except by
Alitalia, Sabena and Olympic. The latter are clearly the smaller carriers in the sample.
Table 2: Number of observations by destination and carrier
JFK LAX NRT CAI SIN Total
KLM 9 8 6 7 9 39
Air France 9 9 9 3 9 39
British Airways 8 9 -* 2 8 27
Lufthansa 9 8 9 8 9 43
Alitalia 3 5 - 6 8 22
Sabena 5 - 6 - - 11
Olympus - - - 2 - 2
Swissair 7 6 9 - 8 30
Total 50 45 39 28 51 213
* BA serves Tokyo. However, no fare data were available
We collected fare data for unrestricted economy class, which more or less means that
we aim our focus at the lower part of the market for business travelers. There are
several good reasons to do so. First of all, some causes for airport dominance, such as
FFPs, higher frequencies and direct flights, apply especially to business travelers. So,
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if airport dominance appears, it is most likely to do so in business markets. 9  The
upper segments of the business markets however, are very small, and not available on
every route. Especially on very short haul routes, airlines offer commuter flights, with
only one class to choose from. An other reason to choose unrestricted fares, is that
two restricted fare may not relate to the same product, since restrictions may differ
substantially.
Table 3 summarizes fare and distance data. The striking point in this table is that the
minimum of Rfare is below unity. This means that some carriers actually offer flights
from A via H to Z at a fare lower than the fare of the main leg (H-Z) of that flight. As
a matter of fact, we found 47 observations with Rfare below unity. Although most
(33) of them are less then four percent below unity, this is a first indication of the
presence of hub domination.
Table 3:  Descriptive statistics
Mean sd minimum maximum
Fare (US$) 3094.08 1092.67 1073.60 5367.90
Distance (Miles) 5388.22 1658.92 1609 8242
Rfare 1.141 0.278 0.479 3.023
Rdist 1.106 0.180 1.015 3.153
6. Empirical results
We estimated specification (A), omitting all non-significant variables, finding positive
and significant hub dominance premiums for Swissair, Air France and Lufthansa.10
Table 4 presents the results for the estimation. Note that the sign of fHZ is pos tive,
meaning that the indirect effect, as defined in section 4, is larger than the direct effect
of competition.
When checking the outliers of specification (A), we found an intriguing pattern
around flights from Brussels to U.S. destinations. A closer look revealed that British
Airways, Air France and Swissair charge significantly lower fares for flights from
                                   
9 This is consistent with the findings of Berry, Carnal andSpiller (1996).
10 As we stated before, the company with the lowest hd  should be the numeraire. In the specification
used here, Sabena is the numeraire, with Alitalia, Olympic, KLM and British Airways not differing
significantly.
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Brussels via their hubs to U.S. destinations. Apparently, these carriers are fighting a
price war over Brussels. Although we cannot be exactly certain on the explanation for
this price war, Brussels seems to be a logical place for such an event, since it is the
only airport in the densely traveled North-West of Europe without a strong
international carrier based on it. We model this ‘Battle for Brussels’ by a dummy for
the combination of origin (Brussels), carriers (British Airways, Air France and
Swissair) and destinations (JFK, LAX) involved.
Both from the t-values of the distinctive parameters as from the log likelihood, it
shows that specification (C) with the Battle for Brussels dummy is superior to
specifications (A) and (B).11 The positive and significant value of lHZ indicates that
the HHI is in this case an inadequate indicator of competition, and that the number of
competitors matters more then the kewn ss of ir marketshares. Furthermore, we
find that the elasticity of fare to distance differs significantly between short and long
haul flights and has the expected sign.
Table 4: Regression results for log Rfare (t-values between brackets)
A A (BRU) C
Constant a 0.62
(5.5)
0.58
(5.7)
1.32
(4.7)
log Rdist b 0.55
(4.5)
0.52
(4.8)
0.37
(2.9)
cost difference between legsbAHZ-bHZ -0.08
(-2.7)
hub dominance premium for Air FrancehdpAF 0.16
(4.6)
0.15
(4.8)
0.14
(4.8)
hub dominance premium for LufthansahdpLH 0.15
(4.3)
0.16
(5.3)
0.15
(5.2)
hub dominance premium for SwissairhdpSR 0.19
(4.8)
0.16
(4.7)
0.14
(4.1)
Battle for Brussels dummy -.052
(-7.6)
-.056
(-8.3)
log of HHI of main leg fHZ 0.24
(4.5)
0.21
(4.5)
0.19
(4.1)
extra weight for number of competitors
within HHI
lHZ 0.51
(3.2)
Log likelihood 62.3 88.8 96.2
adjusted R2 0.33 0.48 0.51
Our results can be interpreted, as we mentioned before, in a hub premium. This
premium reflects the extra price the carrier is confident enough to ask for a route
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originating from the dominated hub. For Air France and Swissair, this premium is
about 14 percent, for Lufthansa it is slightly higher at 15 percent.  These results are
comparable to those in Berry, Carnal and Spiller, 1996. They find a hub premium of
19% for type 2 passengers on large hubs, roughly the US equivalent of the fares
studied here.
7. Concluding remarks
Our results indicate that hub premiums are not typical for the U.S. aviation sector. We
find that Lufthansa, Swissair and Air France charge significant premiums for direct
flights from their hubs. Our results for Air France, Swissair and Lufthansa are
consistent with those of Borenstein (1989, 1991), Berry (1990), Evans and Kessides
(1993) and Berry, Carnal and Spiller (1996), who also find positive hub premiums.
There are however some limitations to our results. First of all, we did not use a
quantified measure of hub dominance. Furthermore, our counter-intuitive finding that
the indirect competition effect is larger than the direct effect implies that further
research on competition in network settings may yield interesting results.
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Appendix A: Rules for collecting data
The following rules were used when collecting fare data:
· All trips are 1 person, round trip flights on unrestricted economy class seats.
· All departure flights must arrive on the first Thursday morning, from a month
after booking the flight.
· All return flights must leave the next Tuesday morning or as soon after that as
possible.
· No switching between airlines is allowed. Some exceptions apply, see below.
· No extra stop is allowed.
· All data on flights sharing a hub and a destination, must be collected on the same
day.
There are some exceptions to the airline switching rules:
· On ten routes from Prague, one or both feeder flights are operated by Czech
Airlines. Czech Airlines has a code sharing agreement with all the carriers in the
sample on routes from and to Prague.
· There are three code sharing flights between KLM and A talia, who belong to the
same alliance.
· KLM once uses its subsidiary KLM UK as a feeder for Heathrow-originating
flights.
· Air France uses the TGV as a feeder for Brussels-originating flights in three
observations.
· In two cases, KLM uses Air France as a return feeder for Paris-originating flights.
We have tested if these exceptions led to significantly different results by adding
dummies for each of  the five exceptions mentioned above and found that none of
them were significantly different from zero.
Apart from the rules mentioned above, a further restriction is implemented, in order to
ensure that no other cost differences blur the image. This restriction states that the
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second leg of an A-H-Z route must have the same flight number as the H-Z route. For
example, if KLM flight from Amsterdam to New York has flight number KL641, then
the second legs of all indirect KLM flights to New York must have the same flight
number. We relax this restriction a little, by allowing the second leg flight to have
another flight number, say, KL643 if the fares for KL641 and KL643 are equal. It
goes without saying that the same conditions should hold for the return flight.
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Appendix B: deriving the Herfindahl-Hirschman index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a widely accepted indicator for
concentration on a market, and is defined as the summed squares of market shares:
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where xi is defined as the output sold by company i. In European aviation, output
measures are however not available on a route level. Here, we use frequency as an
output indicator. In aviation, one could question whether ‘a route’ and ‘a market’ are
the same thing. From the passengers’ point of view, the market consists of all flights
from his origin to his destination city. Therefore, we would also have to take indirect
routes from A to Z into account if we were to examine the concentration level on the
A-Z route. For pragmatic reasons (the number of alternatives would get
uncontrollable), we limit our analysis to one-stop routes. We feel that this limitation
has no severe drawbacks on our results, since travelers in the fare class we study
(economy without restrictions, which about resembles the lower class business
traveler) are unlikely to take trips with more than one stop into account, given the fact
that every city pair in the sample has sufficient frequency on direct and one-stop
flights.
Comparing direct and one-stop flights creates the need to correct for the incon-
venience of the latter. Here, we do so by dividing the frequency of company i by the
extra mileage factor:
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with:
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Implicitly we assume here that a flight with a five percent longer flight distance
implies a five percent lower convenience.
